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The income transfer systems for low-income families in the US and the UK try both to reduce 
poverty and to encourage work. In-work benefits are a key part of both countries’ strategies 
through the earned income tax credit and the working families’ tax credit (and predecessors) 
respectively. But tax credits are only one part of the whole tax and welfare system. In-work 
benefits, taxes and welfare benefits combine in both countries to provide good financial incentives 
for lone parents to do minimum-wage work, but poorer incentives to increase earnings further. But 
direct comparisons of budget constraints hide important points of detail. First, not enough is known 
about what determines take-up of in-work benefits. Second, the considerable differences in 
assessment and payment mechanisms and frequency between EITC and WFTC mean that low-
income families in the US and the UK may respond very differently to apparently similar financial 
incentives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The income transfer systems for low-income families in the US and the UK try 
both to reduce poverty and to encourage work. To help achieve these aims, both 
the US and the UK have used in-work benefits for more than two decades: the 
earned income tax credit (EITC) in the US and the working families’ tax credit 
(WFTC) and its predecessors in the UK. The credits have very similar stated 
objectives, and both were introduced initially just for families with children. 
This reflects the fact that the unemployment trap tends to be worse for families 
with children than for families without children, as out-of-work benefits reflect 
family composition whereas wages do not. Over the past few years, there also 
seems to have been a common political desire between the two countries to 
reduce child poverty, and in-work benefits have been crucial in helping to 
achieve this.  
In-work benefits, though, are only one mechanism used to transfer income to 
families with children. As discussed later, food stamps and temporary assistance 
for needy families (TANF) in the US provide support to low-income working 
and non-working families. In the UK, all families with children are entitled to 
the flat-rate child benefit, and families working less than 16 hours a week can 
claim income support or jobseeker’s allowance. Both countries have a number of 
other means-tested programmes giving explicit or in-kind subsidies to low-
income families with children for healthcare, housing and childcare.  
In this paper, I compare directly the budget constraints for families with 
children in the US and the UK, considering in-work benefits together with the 
other elements of the transfer system and building on earlier comparisons by 
Walker and Wiseman (1997) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1998).
 Focusing on 
lone parents for simplicity and to aid comparability, this paper shows that the 
transfer systems in both countries produce good theoretical financial incentives 
for lone parents to take a minimum-wage job but poor incentives to increase 
earnings beyond that. In both countries, help with housing costs reduces the 
financial reward to work, and the means testing of help with childcare costs 
reduces the incentives for lone parents to increase earnings once they are in 
work.  
But direct comparisons of budget constraints and estimates of the financial 
reward to work constructed using a tax and benefit model hide important points 
of detail. First, budget constraints do not illustrate the many operational 
differences between WFTC and EITC. I argue that these are significant, despite 
the similar aims of the two in-work benefits. In particular, the theoretical 
marginal withdrawal rates implied by the slope of a calculated budget constraint 
are a simplification of reality when, in practice, there are significant gaps 
between assessments of means-tested benefits and differences in the 
responsiveness of the tax system. In general, benefit tapers and taxes will have a In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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financial effect eventually, but not necessarily immediately.
1 This means that the 
different assessment periods and payment mechanisms of EITC and WFTC may 
lead low-income families in the two countries — especially if credit-constrained 
— to react differently to apparently similar financial incentives. For example, we 
could expect labour supply responses to an in-work benefit that is paid annually 
(like EITC) to be different from responses to one that is paid fortnightly or 
monthly (like WFTC), particularly when the value of the benefit can represent 
over a quarter of total family income, as WFTC can do for many families. 
Second, to see how relevant theoretical financial work incentives are across the 
population, take-up of benefits needs to be studied alongside entitlement. What 
we know about take-up of in-work and welfare benefits in the UK and the US 
suggests that take-up rates may vary considerably between the two countries and 
that, within a country, they can vary between benefits and over time.
2  
This paper discusses these points in turn. Section II outlines the programmes 
providing financial support for low-income families in the US and the UK and 
makes direct financial comparisons between EITC and WFTC. Section III 
compares the theoretical budget constraints faced by lone parents in the US and 
the UK, showing the importance of in-work benefits in ensuring that work pays 
and indicating how housing and childcare subsidies in both countries affect the 
financial reward to work. It also reviews what we know about take-up rates and 
caseloads. Section IV explores the key operational differences between EITC 
and WFTC: the payment and assessment rules, including how each interacts with 
other parts of the transfer system. Section V concludes. 
There are some important issues that this paper does not explore. One is the 
effectiveness of in-work benefits in increasing labour supply, the evidence for 
which is reviewed in Blundell (2000) and Hotz and Scholz (2001). My focus on 
lone parents when looking at the financial reward to work means that I do not 
consider the ambiguous work incentives that are provided by EITC and WFTC 
for couples. This paper also does not analyse the longer-term impacts of in-work 
benefits: individuals facing high marginal withdrawal rates will face poor 
incentives to increase earnings, so in-work benefits may reduce their incentive to 
accumulate human capital.
3 In-work benefits may similarly encourage people 
into the type of jobs that provide few opportunities for wage growth.
4 These two 
ideas suggest that the longer-term consequences of in-work benefits should be 
                                                                                                                                    
1US studies talk about the phase-out range of a benefit where increases in income lead to reduced benefit 
entitlement; this is known as a taper in the UK, so I say that an in-work benefit is tapered away as income rises. 
Income is disregarded if it does not affect the value of a means-tested benefit or tax credit. The marginal 
withdrawal rate is the amount of benefit lost and tax paid when income increases at the margin. 
2The caseload of a welfare benefit is the number of families claiming it; the take-up rate is the caseload as a 
proportion of the total number of eligible families.  
3See, for example, Cossa, Heckman and Lochner (1999). 
4Discussed further in Gottschalk (2000), Burtless (forthcoming) and Dickens (forthcoming). Fiscal Studies 
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considered in at least as much detail as their short-term impact upon 
participation and poverty rates. 
II. A DESCRIPTION OF TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
IN THE US AND THE UK 
1. Employment and Poverty Rates for Lone Parents in the US and the UK 
The development of in-work benefits in the US and the UK reflects, in part, the 
labour market experiences of low-income families. This paper does not attempt a 
complete comparison of those here (see, for example, Blundell and Hoynes 
(2000) and Kaye and Nightingale (2000)) but instead highlights the main 
differences in employment and poverty rates for lone parents, anticipating the 
focus on them in Section III. Lone parents in the US and the UK are less likely to 
work full-time than other household types. But there are clear differences in the 
level and trend of lone parents’ employment rates between the two countries: 
annual employment rates for lone mothers in the US rose by 9 percentage points 
between 1984 and 1996 to reach 82 per cent, rising by over 13 percentage points 
for those with young children (Blank, Card and Robins, 2000; Meyer and 
Rosenbaum, 2000). Employment rates in the UK, however, have remained at 
around 45 per cent over the past decade (Blundell and Hoynes, 2000). 
Poverty comparisons are more difficult, as different definitions are used in 
the UK and the US. The most commonly used poverty standard in the UK — and 
the European Union — defines households as poor if they have incomes below 
60 per cent of the national median income, adjusted for household size. In the 
US, there is an official poverty line, which was originally defined by estimating 
the cost of a minimal food budget but is now only uprated to take account of 
annual price changes. This makes the US poverty definition an absolute 
standard, whereas the UK’s definition is a relative one.
5 Overall, the US has 
greater levels of poverty on a within-country relative-income measure, but on an 
absolute measure — such as the US official poverty line — the UK has greater 
poverty amongst children because living standards are lower: for example, 
Dickens and Ellwood (2000) estimate that the whole-population poverty rate in 
the US rose from 25 per cent in 1979 to 32 per cent in 1999, while in the UK it 
rose from 11 per cent to 26 per cent (both based on 50 per cent of mean income 
before taxes and housing costs, adjusted for family size).  
But it is clear that working lone parents are increasingly likely to be in 
poverty in both countries: the US-defined poverty rate for working US lone 
mothers rose from 23 per cent in 1988 to 27 per cent in 1996, and in the UK the 
                                                                                                                                    
5In 1999, the official US poverty standard for a couple with one child was $13,423, and, for a family of four, it 
was $16,895. Sixty per cent of median income net of housing costs was £8,788 and £10,503 for the same 
family types in the UK in 1998–99. The OECD’s purchasing power parity conversion rate for the UK is 0.665 
(so £1 = $1.50). In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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percentage of working lone parents with less than half mean income rose from 
14 per cent in 1979 to 31 per cent in 1995–96, peaking in 1990 at 35 per cent. 
Around a quarter of poor families with children in the US now have at least one 
full-time worker, up from a fifth in 1979. The UK, though, has seen the reverse 
trend: 46 per cent of poor children had at least one (full-time or part-time) 
working parent in 1995–96, compared with 57 per cent in 1979.
6 These trends 
have been accompanied by increased income inequality for families with 
children: in almost all states in the US, the gap between the richest and poorest 
fifth of families has grown significantly; a similar result is true for the UK (Link, 
Bibus and Lyons, 2000). 
2. Financial Support for Low-Income Families in the US 
Low-income families in the US can potentially receive financial support from 
food stamps, temporary assistance for needy families and the earned income tax 
credit. The Medicaid programme and federal housing support provide important 
in-kind transfers. Other smaller programmes provide assistance for low-income 
families (for example: childcare provision; school lunch programmes; 
supplemental food programme for women, infants and children; energy 
assistance; Head Start; and various training programmes).  
Temporary assistance for needy families provides income support to low-
income families in and out of work. TANF was created by the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 
which abolished the old aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) 
programme and replaced it with a block federal grant to states. States now have 
considerable freedom to set the eligibility, generosity, work requirements and 
other TANF rules, making it difficult to characterise the system facing a typical 
low-income family in the US.
7 But most states provide a maximum credit to low-
income families, subject to resource limits, time-limits and work or job-search 
requirements. The credit is then tapered away as income rises, perhaps after an 
initial disregard. For example, Florida provides a maximum monthly credit of 
$331 to a lone-parent family with two children. After a $200 disregard, the credit 
is tapered away at 50 per cent of extra income. Although much attention was 
given to the five-year time-limit when the TANF reforms were announced, it 
only applies to the use of federal funds: states are free to continue paying TANF 
to families if they use state funds, and in California, for example, working 
families can receive TANF payments indefinitely. Food stamps are available to 
low-income adults with and without children. They provide a monthly allowance 
                                                                                                                                    
6US estimates from Bernstein and Hartmann (2000); UK estimates from Gregg, Harkness and Machin (1999). 
7Committee on Ways and Means (1998) describes the rules that the federal government imposes on states. 
Gallagher et al. (1998) provide a comprehensive description of the TANF rules in all states as of October 1997. 
The Welfare Rules database at the Urban Institute is an online database of the key parameters in states’ TANF 
programmes.  Fiscal Studies 
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that is tapered away as income rises, after allowances for housing and caring 
costs: a lone parent with two children is eligible for a maximum payment of 
$335 a month, with a $134 disregard followed by a 24 per cent taper on extra 
earnings, and a childcare expenditure disregard of up to $200 per child (October 
1999–September 2000 figures from US Department of Agriculture (1999)). 
Food stamps and TANF are run by state welfare offices, but the earned 
income tax credit is a federally run programme.
8 Families apply for it when they 
file their annual tax returns; it is a refundable tax credit, meaning that awards in 
excess of tax liability are paid direct to the taxpayer, making it much more 
valuable than an extra tax allowance to families who pay little or no tax. Table 
A.4 in the Appendix contains the details, but, in brief, eligibility depends on 
having some earned income in a year and on the number of qualifying children 
(children can be aged up to 23 if in full-time education). Families with high 
levels of investment income cannot claim (akin to the resource limits in TANF). 
The amount of credit depends upon earnings and the number of qualifying 
children, with a much smaller EITC being available to people with no children. 
Married couples are assessed jointly, and the implications of this are discussed in 
Section IV(3). There are three regions in the credit schedule. In the phase-in 
region, the credit is equal to a percentage of income until the credit equals the 
maximum amount. There is then a flat region across which the maximum credit  
 
FIGURE 1 
EITC and WFTC Schedules, 2000 
Notes: £1 = $1.50. Assumes 2000 tax system in US. Assumes 2000 tax system in UK plus children’s tax credit. 
Assumes two WFTC awards a year and minimum-wage work in UK, so eligible for 30-hour credit at gross 
annual income of £5,772 (52×30×£3.70). 
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is received. In the phase-out region, the credit is tapered away to zero. Table A.4 
has more detail of the present EITC and Figure 1 shows the credit schedule. 
When families file their 2000 tax returns, a family with two or more children 
will receive a maximum credit of $3,888 between incomes of $9,720 and 
$12,690, and the credit will not be fully tapered away until income reaches 
$31,152. Three-fifths of EITC claimants were estimated to be on the phase-out 
portion of the credit in 1998; 23 per cent were on the phase-in and 15 per cent on 
the plateau (Joint Committee on Taxation, 1998). The average EITC award for 
families with children in that year was $1,890. Around 15 per cent of total EITC 
expenditure offsets income tax liabilities, the other 85 per cent representing 
direct cash payments that are refunded to claimants (Internal Revenue Service, 
2000b). About two-thirds of expenditure goes to lone parents (Committee on 
Ways and Means, 1996), and Hotz and Scholz (2001) find that more than half of 
EITC spending goes to families above the official US poverty line. In 1994, 
around a quarter of the total EITC claimed was over-claimed (General 
Accounting Office, 1997), mostly due to taxpayers falsely claiming that they 
have a ‘qualifying child’ (Hotz and Scholz, 2001). 
EITC began in 1975 as a modest programme aimed at offsetting the social 
security payroll tax for low-income families with children. But it has become an 
important plank in the federal government’s anti-poverty strategy, following 
major expansions in the Tax Acts of 1986, 1990 and 1993 (taking effect in 1987, 
1991 and 1994–96 respectively), and it now costs almost as much as food stamps 
and TANF combined.
9 Table A.1 in the Appendix gives a timeline of 
developments in EITC and in in-work benefits in the UK, discussed below.  
Individual states are free to supplement the federal EITC scheme with their 
own earned income tax credits. As of June 2000, 14 states did so, though neither 
Florida nor California (two of the three states with the highest federal EITC 
caseloads) has yet introduced a state EITC. Table 1 gives brief details of state-
level EITCs, drawn from Johnson (1999 and 2000). Low-income families in 
work also have to pay federal and state income taxes and payroll taxes: Table 
A.2 in the Appendix summarises the main parameters of the federal taxes and 
Maag and Lim Rogers (2000) provide details of the state income taxes. Both the 
relatively large federal income tax allowances for dependants and the new $500 
child tax credit mean that income tax liabilities are negligible for low-income 
families with children, but social security contributions, at 7.65 per cent of 
earnings, are more significant.  
There are a number of means-tested programmes providing subsidised 
healthcare, housing and childcare, and all of these programmes will affect the 
budget constraints for low-income families. Medicaid — which has grown   
 
                                                                                                                                    
9In 1999, EITC spending was $31.9 billion, compared with $16.7 billion spent on TANF and $19.0 billion on 
food stamps (cited in Hotz and Scholz (2001)).  Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 1 
State-Level EITCs, June 2000 
  Value of credit 
(% of federal EITC) 
Number of federal 
EITC claimants, 
1997 
Refundable credits    
Colorado 10%  241,770 
District of Columbia  10%  53,616 
Kansas 10%  149,335 
Maryland  10% (15% in 2001)  336,829 
Massachusetts  10% (15% in 2001)  285,476 
Minnesota  15% to 46%, depending on earnings  221,730 
New York  20% (30% in 2003)  1,302,604 
Vermont 32%  37,501 
Wisconsin 4%/14%/43% 
for families with one/two/three children 
260,311 
Non-refundable credits    
Illinois 5%  765,955 
Iowa 6.5%  153,575 
Maine 5%  82,894 
Oregon 5%  204,819 
Rhode Island  26%  60,085 
Sources: Johnson, 1999 and 2000. 
 
substantially in scope over the past decade — and housing subsidies are in-kind 
subsidies available to low-income families (and, in the case of Medicaid, to some 
families with incomes up to 200 per cent of the official poverty line).
10 The two 
most important childcare programmes are the Child Care and Development Fund 
(CCDF) and the dependent care tax credit (DCTC).
11 As with TANF, states have 
considerable flexibility to design their own childcare subsidy programmes under 
the CCDF; most give childcare vouchers to low-income families, charging the 
families an income-related ‘co-payment’ (which could be zero). The CCDF is 
capped and, while there are requirements on states to spend a certain proportion 
of federal money on particular target groups, there is no obligation to serve all 
families who fall into these categories. Middle- and high-income families in the 
US can benefit from the DCTC, which is a non-refundable tax credit for 
employment-related costs relating to dependants, including childcare costs, but 
DCTC is of little benefit to low-income families with low or zero income tax 
liabilities. Anticipating the discussion of the UK system below, DCTC looks 
                                                                                                                                    
10See Gruber (2000) for more details.  
11Blau (2000) is a thorough review of the US federal childcare programmes. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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similar to the UK’s childcare tax credit, except that the childcare tax credit is 
paid as a refundable tax credit, making it worth more to low-income families. 
3. Financial Support for Low-Income Families in the UK 
Like the US, the UK uses more than one programme to support families with 
children.
12 Unlike the US, there is a universal transfer programme, called child 
benefit, which is worth £15 a week for the first child (£10 for subsequent 
children) and taken up by almost all families with children in the UK.
13 Low-
income families working less than 16 hours a week are generally eligible for the 
means-tested jobseeker’s allowance (income-based) (JSA(IB))or income support 
(IS). JSA(IB) and IS are worth the same for equivalent families — £128.35 a 
week for a lone parent with two children from November 2000 including child 
benefit — but JSA(IB) imposes job-search requirements; only couple families 
with long-term sickness or disabilities and lone parents can claim IS. JSA(IB) 
and IS have an earnings disregard of £10 (£15) a week for two-parent families 
(lone parents), followed by a 100 per cent withdrawal rate.  
Neither JSA(IB) nor IS is available to parents working 16 or more hours a 
week: beyond 16 hours, families with children can receive support from the 
working families’ tax credit.
14 The requirement to work 16 hours a week is a 
more restrictive work requirement than applies to EITC in the US, which 
requires only positive earnings over the past year. The amount of credit depends 
upon weekly earnings, hours worked, the number of qualifying children and 
savings (savings over £3,000 reduce the award; savings over £8,000 remove 
eligibility completely). Couples are assessed jointly. There are two regions in the 
credit schedule. The maximum credit is £104.35 a week for a lone parent with 
two children (see Table A.4 in the Appendix for full parameters and Figure 1 for 
a graph of the credit schedule; both refer to rates from June 2000). Beyond an 
after-tax income of £91.45 a week, the credit is tapered away at 55 per cent, with 
a small extra credit for families where someone works more than 30 hours a 
week. The credit is fully tapered away for a family with two children at a gross 
income of £385 a week. In August 2000, the average WFTC award was £76.86 a 
week. The average gross weekly income of claimants was £158 and the average 
number of hours worked weekly was 30.8. Fifty-one per cent of recipients were 
lone parents (Inland Revenue, 2000c).  
                                                                                                                                    
12Discussed further by Brewer, Myck and Reed (2001), who focus on the additional support given to families 
with children compared with that given to those without. 
13The rates given are as at November 2000, to be consistent with the US rates. These, and other UK figures, are 
taken from George et al. (2000), which provides a description of the UK’s benefit system and is updated 
annually.  
14From 2003, adults without children will be able to claim an employment tax credit, to be based on the WFTC 
(HM Treasury, 2000). Fiscal Studies 
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In addition, low-income households can receive help with rented housing 
costs through housing benefit (HB) and help with local taxes through council tax 
benefit. About four-fifths of lone parents and around two-thirds of couples on IS 
or JSA(IB) are also on HB. Working families are less likely to be on HB: it is 
estimated that around 12 per cent of all families on WFTC will also be on HB.
15 
Some families on out-of-work benefits are eligible for help with mortgage 
interest payments.
16 Families on low incomes (all those on IS or JSA and those 
earning less than £14,300 gross) are eligible for in-kind health benefits (although 
these are of considerably less value than Medicaid). Families on out-of-work 
benefits are eligible for free school meals, which may be of more quantitative 
and qualitative importance. 
Working low-income families will pay higher income tax and National 
Insurance contributions, in general, than the US equivalents.
17 Unlike the US, the 
UK tax system is based on individual assessment, with no allowances for 
dependants, although families with children will be able to claim a £520 non-
refundable tax credit
18 from April 2001, phased out where there is a higher-rate 
taxpayer in the family (incomes over £32,785 in 2000). 
The UK’s long history of in-work benefits began with family income 
supplement (FIS) in 1971 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The working 
families’ tax credit was introduced in October 1999 as a replacement to family 
credit (FC) and was fully phased in by April 2000. Although it owes much to its 
predecessor, two key differences are the generosity of WFTC and the payment 
mechanism. WFTC is more generous than FC in three ways: its credits, 
particularly those for young children, are higher; families can earn more before 
the credit is phased out; and it has a lower withdrawal rate.
19  
WFTC also significantly changed the system of support for childcare costs. 
Under FC, childcare costs up to £60 (£100) a week for families with one (two) 
children under 12 could be disregarded before the credit was phased out. Under 
WFTC, there is a separate childcare tax credit. This is more generous than the 
FC childcare disregard — providing a 70 per cent subsidy to the parent on costs 
of up to £150 a week for families with two or more children of any age — and is 
paid in addition to WFTC, rather than being an income disregard, making it 
worth more to those on the lowest incomes. This also means that families 
                                                                                                                                    
15See Department of Social Security (2000a and 2000b) for out-of-work families and Hansard (2000) for 
WFTC claimants, but note that the latter estimate assumes that all families newly eligible for WFTC — very 
few of whom would be eligible for HB — claim WFTC.  
16For loans taken out since October 1995, there is a 40-week qualifying period; for loans taken out before 
October 1995, there is an eight-week qualifying period followed by an 18-week period of a 50 per cent reduced 
rate. 
17See Table A.3 for the main rates and Gale (1997) for an analysis of the whole UK tax system from a US 
perspective. 
18A non-refundable tax credit reduces the annual tax bill by a certain amount. If the amount of tax due before 
the credit is less than the value of the credit, the excess value is lost.  
19See Blundell et al. (2000) and Dilnot and McCrae (1999) for a more detailed comparison of WFTC and FC.  In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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receiving the childcare tax credit can still receive support at higher incomes than 
those shown in Figure 1: a lone parent with two children claiming the maximum 
childcare tax credit will not have her credit fully tapered away until she reaches a 
gross weekly income of £660. The number of families claiming the childcare tax 
credit in August 2000 was 124,000, a 165 per cent increase on the number using 
the disregard in FC, but still only 11 per cent of the total WFTC caseload. One 
key difference from the US — where CCDF-eligible families can purchase 
childcare from relatives — is that the childcare tax credit does not subsidise paid 
childcare arrangements with unregistered childcare providers. 
III. THE FINANCIAL INCENTIVE TO WORK FOR LONE PARENTS 
IN THE US AND THE UK 
1. Total Financial Support for Lone Parents in the US and the UK 
Figures 2 and 3 show the relationship between gross and net income for a lone 
parent with two children in the US and the UK respectively, broken down by  
 
FIGURE 2 
Gross and Net Incomes for Lone Parents with Two Children, US 
Notes: Assumes 2000 federal tax system and Florida’s TANF system. Ignores housing and childcare costs and 
subsidies. Assumes all TANF and food stamps requirements are met and that all income is earned. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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FIGURE 3 
Gross and Net Incomes for Lone Parents with Two Children, UK 
Notes: Assumes 2000 tax and benefit system plus children’s tax credit. Ignores housing and childcare costs and 
subsidies. Assumes that all income is earned, two WFTC awards a year and minimum-wage work in UK, so 
that eligibility for WFTC and for the 30-hour credit occurs at gross annual income of £3,078 and £5,772 
respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
income source and assuming full take-up of all entitled benefits.
20 The focus is 
on lone parents, both to ease comparison and because lone parents make up over 
half the caseload of both EITC and WFTC. 
Figure 4 shows the gross-income–net-income schedule for a lone parent with 
two children in the US together with marginal withdrawal rates (MWRs). 
Beyond incomes of around $2,500, the –40 per cent marginal tax rate of EITC is 
completely offset by payroll taxes and tapers on welfare payments. Figure 5 
shows the same for the UK. MWRs are higher, in general, in the UK, and there 
are discontinuities in the budget constraint at the points of eligibility for WFTC 
and the 30-hour credit. 
                                                                                                                                    
20Assuming TANF payments in Florida, chosen partly as it seems to contain the median — or at least decisive 
— US voter. I am updating Walker and Wiseman (1997) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) — who both 
compare the budget constraint for low-income families in the UK and the US in 1996 — to reflect the reforms 
to TANF and WFTC since then. I have ignored employers’ payroll taxes and National Insurance contributions 
in these graphs, mostly to avoid having to analyse incidence. Take-up rates are discussed below; if TANF time-
limits reduce take-up, then the incentive to work will be greater than shown here.  
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FIGURE 4 
Marginal Withdrawal Rates and Net Incomes for Lone Parents with Two Children, 
US 
Notes: As Figure 2. ‘Marginal withdrawal rates’ as drawn are actually average withdrawal rates over income 
increments of $750. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
FIGURE 5 
Marginal Withdrawal Rates and Net Incomes for Lone Parents with Two Children, 
UK 
Notes: As Figure 3. ‘Marginal withdrawal rates’ as drawn are actually average withdrawal rates over income 
increments of £500. 
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FIGURE 6 
Net Financial Support as a Percentage of Gross Income for Lone Parents with Two 
Children, US and UK 
Notes: As Figures 2 and 3. £1=$1.50. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
FIGURE 7 
Net Income as a Fraction of Female Median Earnings for Lone Parents with Two 
Children, US and UK 
Notes: As Figures 2 and 3. Median gross weekly female earnings in 2000 were $491 and £338 (sources: Bureau 
of Labour Statistics (2000) and Office for National Statistics (2000) respectively). 
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FIGURE 8 
Marginal Withdrawal Rates for Lone Parents with Two Children, US and UK 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 6 compares net financial support in the US and the UK, having 
expressed both schedules in sterling (£1 = $1.50). Financial support is more 
generous at low incomes in the UK, but it falls at a faster rate as income 
increases, so that UK families pay more in income and payroll taxes than US 
families at medium and high incomes. Figure 7 directly compares the net income 
schedules on a common scale (following Walker and Wiseman (1997)), using 
incomes relative to median female weekly earnings.
21 Expressed relative to 
median earnings, Figure 7 confirms that the UK’s transfer system for low-
income families is more generous than the US’s at low incomes but less 
generous above female median earnings. Figure 8 makes the same comparisons 
for marginal withdrawal rates. In both the US and the UK, entitlement to in-work 
benefits ends at income levels roughly equal to female median earnings, but 
marginal withdrawal rates are generally higher in the UK than in the US. 
2. Work Incentives for Low-Income Families in the US and the UK 
(a) Replacement Ratios and Average Withdrawal Rates 
Table 2 shows implied replacement ratios and average withdrawal rates (AWRs) 
for a lone parent with two children under three work scenarios in 12 US states. 
                                                                                                                                    
21US median female full-time gross weekly earnings in 2000Q3 were $491, 3 per cent lower than the UK figure 
of £338 in 2000 at $1.50 = £1. Sources: Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2000; Office for National Statistics, 2000. 
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Table 3 shows the AWRs for increasing work effort beyond part-time minimum-
wage work.
22  
There is a strong financial incentive to do some work: in the 12 states listed 
in Table 2, a lone parent moving into part-time work will keep at least 70 per 
cent of her gross earnings. In Mississippi, she will see her income rise by 106 per 
cent of gross earnings through the combination of a high TANF disregard and 
EITC. A lone parent moving into a full-time minimum-wage job will keep a 
smaller proportion of her gross earnings, ranging from 66 per cent in Michigan 
to 101 per cent in Mississippi. But the budget constraint gives little extra 
incentive to move into a better-paid full-time job: replacement ratios for a full-
time job at $9 an hour are very similar in most states to those at the minimum 
wage. Table 3 confirms that a lone parent moving from a full-time, minimum- 
 
TABLE 2 
Average Withdrawal Rates and Replacement Ratios for Lone Parents with Two 
Children Moving into Work under Three Work Scenarios in 12 US States 
  Average withdrawal rate  Replacement ratio 
















Alabama  6%  7% 29% 54% 40% 33% 
California  9% 19% 49% 67% 57% 55% 
Colorado  17% 27% 41% 65% 54% 46% 
Florida  6% 15% 36% 60% 48% 42% 
Massachusetts  13% 20% 49% 68% 57% 54% 
Michigan  23% 34% 46% 69% 59% 51% 
Minnesota  9% 17% 47% 65% 54% 52% 
Mississippi  –6% –1% 23% 48% 36% 29% 
New  Jersey  23% 26% 44% 68% 56% 49% 
New  York  16% 21% 48% 69% 58% 54% 
Texas  10%  6% 28% 56% 41% 34% 
Washington  30% 31% 51% 73% 60% 55% 
Notes: Average withdrawal rate is the percentage of earnings lost in forgone benefits and extra tax payments. 
Total income includes earnings, TANF benefit, cash value of food stamps, federal EITC and state tax credits 
less employee payroll taxes and federal and state income tax. Minimum wage was $5.15 in 1998. Assumes 4.3 
weeks in a month. Assumes no childcare costs. 
Source: Author’s calculations from Table 2 of Acs et al. (1998). 
                                                                                                                                    
22These tables are drawn from Acs et al. (1998), who model work incentives in 12 states accounting for the 
effects of TANF, food stamps, federal income tax, federal EITC, state-level income taxes and state-level earned 
income tax credits. Their data relate to 1997; the main changes since then have been expansion in some state 
EITCs. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) produce comparable figures for lone mothers between 1984 and 1996, 
considering taxes, welfare, Medicaid and employer benefits. Maag and Lim Rogers (2000) offer similar 
estimates for 13 states in 1999, although the focus is on generosity rather than work incentives. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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TABLE 3 
Average Withdrawal Rates for Lone Parents with Two Children Increasing Work 
Effort in 12 US States 
  Compared with part-time, 
minimum wage 
Compared with full-time, 
minimum wage 






Alabama 8%  40%  58% 
California 33%  69%  89% 
Colorado 39%  52%  59% 
Florida 28% 50%  63% 
Massachusetts 28%  66%  87% 
Michigan 47%  57%  63% 
Minnesota 27%  66%  89% 
Mississippi 7%  37%  55% 
New Jersey  30%  53%  67% 
New York  27%  64%  85% 
Texas 0%  36%  57% 
Washington 33%  60%  76% 
Note: Average withdrawal rate is the percentage of extra earnings lost in forgone benefits and extra tax 
payments compared with the reference situation. 
Source: Author’s calculations from Table 2 of Acs et al. (1998). 
 
wage job to a $9-an-hour job will only keep between 11 and 45 per cent of her 
additional earnings. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the calculations for low-income families in the UK.
23 As 
in the US, lone parents have very good financial incentives to take some work 
but poor financial incentives to move beyond minimum-wage jobs. A lone parent 
with two children moving into part-time work will see her income rise by more 
than her gross earnings, thanks to WFTC — a more generous situation than in 
most US states. The AWR for full-time minimum-wage work is positive but low: 
a lone parent can keep 90 per cent of her earnings as she moves into full-time 
work at the minimum wage. The kink in the budget constraint comes around the 
point where a lone parent moves beyond minimum-wage work onto the WFTC 
taper: the AWR for moving beyond full-time minimum-wage work is around 70 
per cent. As with the US, replacement ratios for full-time jobs at £6.50 an hour 
are similar to those for full-time jobs at the minimum wage. 
                                                                                                                                    
23The figures are based on the 2000–01 tax and benefit system with the addition of the children’s tax credit, 
which was due to be introduced in April 2001 at £442 a year but is now worth £520 a year after the March 
2001 Budget (too late to affect these calculations). Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 4 
Average Withdrawal Rates and Replacement Ratios for Low-Income Families 
Moving into Work under Three Work Scenarios in the UK 
  Average withdrawal rate  Replacement ratio 
















Lone parent        
One  child  5% 11% 36% 58% 46% 40% 
Two  children –2%  7% 33% 63% 52% 46% 
Couple family        
One  child  45% 34% 49% 76% 60% 53% 
Two  children 39% 30% 47% 78% 64% 57% 
Notes: Average withdrawal rate is the percentage of earnings lost in forgone benefits and extra tax payments. 
Total income includes earnings, WFTC or IS and child benefit less employee National Insurance contributions 
and income tax. Assumes minimum wage of £3.70. Assumes 4.3 weeks in a month. Assumes no childcare 
costs. £6.50 is 75 per cent higher than £3.70, corresponding to $9.00 and $5.15 in the US examples. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
TABLE 5 
Average Withdrawal Rates for Low-Income Families Increasing Their Work Effort 
in the UK 
  Compared with part-time, 
minimum wage 
Compared with full-time, 
minimum wage 






Lone parent     
One  child  20% 51% 69% 
Two  children  20% 51% 69% 
Couple family     
One  child  20% 51% 69% 
Two  children  20% 51% 69% 
Note: Average withdrawal rate is the percentage of extra earnings lost in forgone benefits and extra tax 
payments compared with the reference situation. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The financial reward to work is generally lower in the UK for couples with 
children than for lone parents, as couples receive a higher out-of-work income 
but the same in-work income. Once in work, couples face the same incentives to 
increase earnings as lone parents. This paper does not present detailed figures for 
married couples in the US, but in those states that did not extend TANF 
payments to couples, they would clearly face a larger financial gain to work than 
lone parents. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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(b) What Contribution Do In-Work Benefits Have in Making Work Pay? 
The financial gain to work in both countries is obviously worse without in-work 
benefits. But there is a qualitative difference between the US and the UK. Tables 
6 and 7 show the proportion of the financial gain to work that comes from in-
work benefits. Without in-work benefits, the gain to work for lone parents 
moving into minimum-wage jobs in the US would be roughly halved. EITC 
forms a greater proportion of the gain to work for full-time minimum-wage jobs  
 
TABLE 6 
In-Work Benefits as a Percentage of the Gain to Work for a Lone Mother with Two 
Children under Three Work Scenarios in 12 US States 






Alabama 42%  42%  23% 
California 44%  49%  34% 
Colorado 49%  53%  28% 
Florida 42%  46%  26% 
Massachusetts 51%  53%  36% 
Michigan 52%  59%  32% 
Minnesota 51%  54%  38% 
Mississippi 38%  39%  22% 
New Jersey  53%  54%  30% 
New York  57%  60%  39% 
Texas 44% 42% 24% 
Washington 58%  58%  34% 
Notes: As Table 2. 
Source: Author’s calculations from Table 5 of Acs et al. (1998). 
 
TABLE 7 
In-Work Benefits as a Percentage of the Gain to Work for Low-Income Families 
Moving into Work under Three Work Scenarios in the UK 






Lone parent      
One child  113%  64%  24% 
Two children  140%  82%  40% 
Couple family      
One child  197%  86%  30% 
Two children  233%  109%  50% 
Notes: As Table 4. 
Source: Author’s calculations. Fiscal Studies 
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than for part-time work because the credit increases in value for gross incomes 
under $9,720. But in-work benefits form a substantially higher proportion of the 
gain to work for low-income families in the UK: indeed, WFTC awards can be 
greater than the financial gain to work for minimum-wage jobs (i.e. there would 
be a negative financial gain to part-time work without WFTC).
24 This difference 
is partly due to EITC and WFTC playing different roles in the overall structure 
of taxes and welfare payments. EITC has been explicitly designed so that it sits 
on top of other welfare benefits and tax payments, whereas WFTC is a more 
integral part of the UK’s welfare benefit system, complementing income support 
and interacting with housing benefit. 
(c) Childcare and Other In-Work Costs 
The analysis above has ignored in-work costs, of which childcare will be the 
most important for lone parents. As Section II outlined, the systems for 
subsidising childcare vary within the US, and, with this huge variation in state 
CCDF rules, it is difficult to quantify how childcare subsidies affect the financial 
reward to work of lone parents in the US, let alone the difference between the 
US and the UK. In addition, the discretionary nature of childcare subsidies in the 
US means that many apparently eligible families do not benefit. Theoretically, 
childcare subsidy programmes increase the reward to work (unless mothers work 
in order to afford high-quality childcare), but the means testing of support 
reduces the incentive to increase earnings conditional on employment — the 
same pattern that is present in the budget constraint without childcare subsidies. 
In the UK, the childcare tax credit has the potential to increase significantly the 
income range over which a 69 per cent marginal withdrawal rate applies, 
although, as of February 2000, only 18,000 childcare tax credit claimants (15 per 
cent of the total) have childcare costs of £90 or more. (The maximum allowable 
costs are £100 for one child or £150 for more than one child.) 
(d) The Effects of Housing Tenure on Work Incentives 
Low-income families may be eligible for help with the cost of renting (in the UK 
and the US) or with mortgage interest payments (out-of-work families in the UK 
only). Tables 8 and 9 repeat Tables 4 and 5 to show the reward to work for low-
income families claiming housing benefit and council tax benefit (CTB). These 
two benefits significantly reduce the financial incentive to work at low levels of 
earnings. Couple families on HB and CTB can only keep a fifth of gross earnings 
when moving into part-time minimum-wage work and less than a third of any 
further increases in earnings. Lone parents on HB and CTB moving into work  
 
                                                                                                                                    
24Brewer (2000) shows the effect of WFTC on the budget constraint, replacement ratios and average 
withdrawal rates under the previous work scenarios. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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TABLE 8 
Average Withdrawal Rates and Replacement Ratios for Low-Income Families 
Receiving Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Moving into Work under Three 
Work Scenarios in the UK 
  Average withdrawal rate  Replacement ratio 
















Lone parent        
One  child  57% 51% 59% 83% 71% 62% 
Two  children 56% 51% 58% 85% 75% 66% 
Couple family        
One  child  80% 76% 73% 93% 86% 75% 
Two  children 79% 75% 73% 94% 87% 78% 
Notes: As Table 4 except this table includes effect of housing benefit and council tax benefit at average rents. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
TABLE 9 
Average Withdrawal Rates for Low-Income Families Receiving Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit Increasing Their Work Effort in the UK 
  Compared with part-time, 
minimum wage 
Compared with full-time, 
minimum wage 






Lone parent     
One  child  44% 59% 69% 
Two  children  44% 59% 69% 
Couple family     
One  child  70% 69% 69% 
Two  children  70% 69% 69% 
Notes: As Table 5. Average withdrawal rate is the percentage of extra earnings lost in forgone benefits and 
extra tax payments compared with the reference situation. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
face an average withdrawal rate of over 50 per cent on their total earnings (when 
taking a job, a lone parent not on HB will never face an average withdrawal rate 
above 51 per cent on total earnings). A similar result is true for those families 
receiving federal housing subsidies in the US: lone parents see income net of 
housing costs rise by less than a third when taking a part-time minimum-wage 
job. Subsequent increases of income to full-time minimum-wage work and then 
to full-time work at $9 an hour (each representing a 75 per cent increase in gross 
earnings) would lead to income increases of only 14 per cent and 7 per cent Fiscal Studies 
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respectively.
25 But, as Section II showed, housing subsidies in the US are 
relatively less important amongst the population of low-income families than 
housing benefit is in the UK. 
Section II described how families on out-of-work benefits in the UK can 
receive help with mortgage interest payments after a qualifying period of 26 or 
40 weeks. This support contributes to the unemployment trap as there is no 
comparable support for working adults with mortgages, following the abolition 
of mortgage interest tax relief in April 1999. The average weekly payment to 
lone parents receiving help with mortgage interest was £41.68 in February 2000 
(Department of Social Security, 2000a): this raises the AWRs for a lone parent 
with two children from –2/7/33 per cent to 54/39/52 per cent for the three work 
scenarios in Table 4 (and replacement ratios up from 63 per cent to 84 per cent 
for part-time minimum-wage work). But relatively few families are affected by 
this relatively severe unemployment trap: around 210,000 working-age 
households (with and without children) received help with mortgage interest 
payments in 1999, or 6.6 per cent of families on IS and 5.2 per cent of families 
on JSA(IB) (Department of Social Security, 2000a and 2000b). 
3. What Do We Know about Take-Up Rates? 
Actual budget constraints across the population depend upon whether low-
income families receive the benefits to which they are entitled. The effect of in-
work benefits and other transfers on work incentives and poverty will clearly be 
smaller the lower are take-up rates. It might also be expected that take-up is non-
random, with families entitled to smaller amounts of in-work benefits less likely 
to claim. 
As Figure 9 shows, the caseloads of in-work benefits have grown in both the 
US and the UK since their introduction, reflecting a steady increase in their 
generosity and thus the eligible population. The EITC caseload has tripled since 
its introduction in 1975, and the WFTC caseload is now 16 times higher than the 
FIS caseload in the same year (see Brewer (2000)). The EITC caseload is over 
15 times greater than the WFTC caseload, although the two in-work benefits end 
their phase-outs at roughly the same income levels and the working-age 
population in the US is only around five times as great as that of the UK. Part of 
the reason for this will be the different eligibility rules: low-income families 
need to work 16 hours a week to get WFTC, a stricter work requirement than 
that for EITC. Another factor will be the differences in the distributions of pre-
transfer earnings for low-income families.
26 Figure 10 presents changes in the 
                                                                                                                                    
25These are the median values in Table 6 in Acs et al. (1998). The equivalent figures for the UK lone parent are 
18 per cent and 15 per cent. 
26Gosling and Lemieux (2000) present changes in the distribution of female wages in the US and the UK, but 
they do not isolate lone mothers. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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expenditure per claimant, which has increased by far more in the UK than in the 
US, particularly in the past decade. 
Estimates of take-up rates for EITC are limited, with a recent survey 
concluding that ‘we are lacking even the most basic information about the 
participation rate of the [EITC] since 1990’ (Hotz and Scholz, 2001). The study  
 
FIGURE 9 
In-Work Benefit Caseloads in the US and the UK 
Source: Author’s calculations from Inland Revenue (2000c) and Committee on Ways and Means (2000). 
 
FIGURE 10 
Expenditure per Claimant on In-Work Benefits in the US and the UK 
Note: £1=$1.65 in 1998. 
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cited, which used data from 1990, found that 81–86 per cent of eligible families 
claimed the credit, higher than estimates for welfare benefits (Scholz, 1994). But 
there have been significant increases in the credit since 1990, so it is likely that 
take-up rates have also changed if take-up is related to the size of the award. 
There are no estimates of take-up for WFTC yet, but government estimates are 
that 68 per cent of families eligible for family credit claimed it in 1998–99, 
corresponding to 76 per cent of total possible expenditure (Department of Social 
Security, 2000c).  
Whilst the EITC caseload has risen, welfare and food stamps caseloads both 
fell dramatically during the 1990s, welfare caseloads falling from 14.1 million in 
1993 to 6.9 million in 1999, and food stamps caseloads falling by 25 per cent 
between August 1996 and September 1998. Likely causes of these falls include 
the 1996 PRWORA reforms to TANF and the sustained strong US labour market 
throughout the 1990s, as well as the sustained increase in the real value of EITC 
over this period.
27 But there has been little or no attempt to see if take-up rates 
for welfare benefits have changed over the period — although this is no easy 
task now that there are very few standard rules or parameters for TANF 
payments across states. Modelling the time-limited nature of TANF payments 
will be key to any post-1996 analysis, and this will be very difficult since states 
have discretion to exempt particularly needy cases from the time-limits and to 
supplement federal funds with state funds. In practice, much may depend on the 
attitude of individual welfare offices. Past studies of take-up rates of welfare 
benefits are now slightly dated. Tables 15-1 to 15-3 in Committee on Ways and 
Means (1998) show how receipt of food stamps and AFDC overlapped among 
low-income families between 1984 and 1995, and Table 15-8 gives some 
estimates for take-up rates for food stamps between 1979 and 1992. 
More is known about the take-up rates of welfare benefits in the UK: take-up 
of income support by lone parents is around 96 per cent of the eligible 
population (Department of Social Security, 2000c). Historically, the number of 
lone parents on income support has been closely linked to the number of 
workless lone parents, which is not surprising, as — unlike in the US — there 
have been no substantial statutory or attitudinal changes towards lone parents’ 
eligibility for income support between 1988 and 1998. 
IV. IS IT VALID TO COMPARE THEORETICAL BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS? 
So EITC and WFTC have apparent similarities: they are aimed at raising the gain 
to work for low-income families, both to encourage families into work and to 
alleviate poverty, and both programmes depend upon income, resources and the 
                                                                                                                                    
27See Council of Economic Advisers (1999) and Zedlewski and Brauner (1999) for two studies amongst many 
that attempt to explain this phenomenon. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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presence of children. Each is crucial to providing some financial incentives to 
work for low-income families. But the two in-work benefits differ significantly 
in their assessment periods and payment mechanisms, and this could lead to 
substantial differences in behaviour in response to apparently similar financial 
incentives. There are also many complexities of the TANF programmes that are 
not captured in a simple budget constraint. 
1. Assessment Period and Payment Mechanism 
EITC is closely linked with the US income tax system and is therefore paid 
annually in arrears, with the credit assessed on the past year’s income. 
Applicants claim the credit when they file an annual tax return and they receive 
the award as a payable rebate of their annual income tax bill. WFTC, though, 
does not work in the same way as the income tax system in the UK: WFTC is a 
weekly award, assessed every 26 weeks on a snapshot of average weekly income. 
The assessment period is between seven weeks and four months, depending on 
the frequency of wage payments. The award is then paid at a fixed rate during 
the next 26 weeks, regardless of any changes in income or employment status 
(some changes in family circumstances trigger a reassessment of the award). 
Unlike means-tested benefits or income tax, there is no concept of being 
underpaid or overpaid during this 26-week period. There are three implications 
of these features. First, the long gaps between the assessment of in-work benefits 
will mean that marginal withdrawal rates calculated by a tax and benefit model 
will not apply to recipients in the very short run. Second, there should be 
different behavioural and economic effects between receiving an in-work benefit 
annually and receiving it fortnightly or monthly where families are myopic or 
credit-constrained. Third, in the UK, the difference between assessment and non-
assessment periods introduces some short-run incentives to alter labour supply 
and manipulate earnings between periods.  
(a) How Appropriate Are Theoretical Marginal Withdrawal Rates in the Very 
Short Run? 
The theoretical marginal withdrawal rates implied by the structure of in-work 
benefits interacting with other parts of the tax and benefit system are a 
simplification when, in reality, there are significant gaps between assessments. 
Tapers and tax rates will have a financial effect eventually, but not necessarily 
immediately. Brewer (2000) discusses how these complications affect a simple 
inter-temporal model of labour supply, but, as an example, consider a lone 
mother in the UK receiving WFTC and housing benefit and earning enough to 
pay income tax and to be on the phase-out portion of WFTC.
28 In the 
                                                                                                                                    
28This implies a gross income of over £140 a week and rent levels above the national average for social 
housing. Fiscal Studies 
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mathematical order in which the tapers are calculated, the lone parent would lose 
32 per cent of any increase in gross earnings to income tax and National 
Insurance payments, then lose 55 per cent of the remainder to the WFTC taper 
and then lose 65 per cent of the remainder to the HB taper. The combined 
marginal withdrawal rate is 89 per cent.
29 But each of these tapers has a different 
responsiveness: HB awards adjust weekly and income tax and National 
Insurance contributions adjust monthly. By contrast, the WFTC award would not 
adjust until the end of the 26-week award period. So, in practice, a £10 increase 
in weekly earnings would lead to a £1.99 fall in HB the next week.
30 The extra 
£3.20 in income tax and National Insurance contributions would start to be 
collected the next month. The WFTC award would be reassessed within the next 
six months, and the award would then fall by 55 per cent of the increase in net 
income, or £3.74, leading to an overall increase in disposable income for the lone 
parent of £1.07. During this period of adjustment, which lasts up to six months, 
the lone parent would also be liable for any undertaxation or any overpayment of 
HB. 
Similarly, a lone mother in the US would see TANF and food stamps 
payments fall one or two months after an increase in gross earnings, but she 
would not see the effect on her income tax payments and EITC until the next 
fiscal year-end.  
(b) Frequency of Payment 
There is a considerable difference between the two countries in the frequency of 
payments. EITC recipients can apply to have up to $1,400 worth of EITC paid in 
advance through the pay-packet, but only 1.1 per cent of recipients elected for 
this in 1998 (cited in Hotz and Scholz (2001)). Smeeding, Phillips and O’Connor 
(2000) characterise a number of reasons why this might be so: compliance cost 
(although this seems low); uncertainty over annual earnings, which raises the 
probability that recipients will have to pay back advance payments at year-end; 
employees’ unwillingness to tell their employers they are receiving EITC; 
employers’ unwillingness to participate; and a desire to receive annual payments 
for the ‘enforced saving’ aspects. Barrow and McGranahan (2000) find evidence 
of higher expenditure by EITC-eligible families compared with EITC-ineligible 
families on consumer durables in the month (February) when most EITC refunds 
are made. But there is little work on the relative importance of these factors, 
which could shed more light on how recipients treat EITC payments. With the 
low take-up of the monthly payment option, it is arguable that EITC acts ‘more 
as an end-of-year reward than a real-time incentive for undertaking a few more 
hours of work’ (Walker and Wiseman, 1997). Hotz and Scholz (2001) argue that 
                                                                                                                                    
29The overall taper rate is calculated as 32% + 55%×(1–32%) + 65%×[1 – {32% + 55%×(1–32%)}] = 89.3%. 
30The HB taper of 65 per cent applies to income after taxes and WFTC, and the award calculation incorporates 
the future changes in tax, National Insurance contributions and WFTC. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
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this delay between changes in earnings and changes in EITC payments means 
that EITC has a greater impact on participation than on hours worked. There is a 
substantial contrast here with the UK, where WFTC payments are paid either 
fortnightly (for non-earning recipients in a couple) or with wage payments. This 
may reflect the greater importance of WFTC payments as a proportion of total 
income: the calculations behind Figures 2 and 3 show that EITC represents under 
a quarter of total disposable income, but WFTC can represent over 40 per cent of 
total income for low-income parents. More frequent payment is consistent, too, 
with UK studies showing that predictability of income payments is the key to 
managing on a low income, with WFTC providing a fixed income stream over 
26 weeks.
31 
(c) Short-Run Labour Market Dynamics 
Because WFTC has a snapshot assessment period of earnings followed by a 
period when there is no consideration of earnings, individuals have an incentive 
to substitute labour supply between assessment periods and non-assessment 
periods to maximise their WFTC award. This distortion of behaviour has been 
little considered by the literature. Evidence from the Family Resources Survey 
— which can identify whether people on family credit are in an assessment 
period — is suggestive: the participation rate for women with working partners 
on FC during assessment periods is 21 per cent, but between the assessment 
periods, when the in-work benefits are really just a time-limited lump-sum 
transfer, this rises to 28 per cent (Blundell and Walker, 2000).
32 EITC does not 
give this incentive, although the fact that the marginal withdrawal rate of EITC 
varies with income does give a theoretical incentive for people to substitute 
labour supply between fiscal years, although it is not clear whether this is a real 
concern in practice. 
2. Interactions with Other Parts of the Tax and Benefit System 
There are differences in what counts as income when in-work benefits are 
assessed in the US and the UK, and in whether in-work benefits are counted as 
income for other means-tested transfers. Both EITC and WFTC generally 
disregard other transfer payments (i.e. WFTC disregards, amongst others, 
attendance allowance, child benefit, education maintenance allowance, housing 
benefit, council tax benefit, maternity allowance and statutory maternity pay; 
EITC disregards food stamps and TANF payments). But the credits treat tax 
                                                                                                                                    
31Thomas and Pettigrew (1998), cited in Snape, Molloy and Kumar (1999), although this does refer to 
households surviving on out-of-work benefits only. Snape et al. (1999) also find that out-of-work families 
prefer to be paid benefits weekly or fortnightly to aid them in budgeting weekly. Wheatley (2001) cites 
examples of claimants who would prefer WFTC to be paid fortnightly rather than together with wages. 
32The average withdrawal rate on extra earnings in non-assessment periods is 32 per cent, compared with 69 
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payments differently: EITC is based on gross income but WFTC is assessed on 
income after income tax and National Insurance payments. Basing a means-
tested award on net income ensures that marginal withdrawal rates never exceed 
100 per cent, but equally it means that the impact of tax cuts on tax credit 
recipients is dulled. As Section III showed, marginal withdrawal rates for EITC 
recipients are still relatively low despite it being assessed on gross income, but 
this is because the rates of income tax and payroll tax, and the EITC phase-out 
rate, are low in the US compared with in the UK.  
Since 1991, EITC awards have not counted as income in other parts of the US 
tax and welfare system.
33 States are prohibited from counting EITC awards in 
food stamps, supplemental security income and Medicaid assessments. EITC 
awards did not count as income when assessing AFDC awards but, since 1997, 
states have been permitted to count EITC payments as income when assessing 
TANF payments. By contrast, WFTC awards do count as income in assessments 
of housing benefit and council tax benefit awards.
34 As Section III showed, this 
makes it more important to consider the entire budget constraint either when 
comparing the generosity of WFTC and FC or when calculating marginal and 
average withdrawal rates. 
3. Eligibility Rules 
Both WFTC and EITC affect the financial incentive to form a couple because 
they provide the same level of support to families with the same (combined) 
income, regardless of the number of adults. This so-called ‘marriage non-
neutrality’
35 is an inevitable feature of any system with joint assessment and non-
proportional tax rates. Eissa and Hoynes (1999 and 2000) discuss this in more 
detail, including the financial incentives to marry given by the US federal tax 
system. They note that EITC provides a positive marriage incentive for very-low-
income couples (i.e. those with joint incomes of less than $9,720), a neutral one 
over the maximum plateau and a negative one at higher incomes. Hotz and 
Scholz (2001) conclude that ‘much less attention has been paid in the literature 
to the impacts of the EITC on marital status compared to other assistance 
programs’; the same can be said for WFTC in the UK, but as a small step, I can 
say that WFTC only ever gives a negative financial incentive to form a couple.  
Brewer (2000) discusses how the recognition of marriage in the US system 
implies differences in how the credits treat unmarried couples. He also looks at 
                                                                                                                                    
33When introduced, EITC payments did count as income in AFDC calculations; the 1991 reform therefore 
increased the value of EITC to families with low earnings, especially when taken alongside the reform in the 
same year that removed the requirement for claimants to earn more in a year than they received in AFDC 
payments. 
34This was also the case under family credit. Giles, Johnson and McCrae (1997) illustrate the effect of the 
interaction of HB and FC on the gain to work for tenants in the social sector. 
35A US phrase, as the US tax system depends upon marital status; I use ‘couple’ to mean ‘married couple’ in 
the US and ‘married or cohabiting couple’ in the UK. In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work 
69 
differences in the definition of ‘children’: WFTC uses the usual definition in the 
UK’s welfare system of a child under 16 or a child under 19 but in full-time 
education, but EITC uses a far broader definition of all children under 19 and 
children under 24 in full-time — including higher — education.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The goals of income transfer systems in the US and the UK for low-income 
families are both to reduce poverty and welfare dependency and to encourage 
work, and both countries have made in-work benefits a key part of their strategy. 
But in-work benefits are only one mechanism used in the US and the UK to 
transfer income to low-income families, and, once all transfers are considered, 
the budget constraint for a lone parent looks quite different from the in-work 
credit schedule.  
The financial incentives to work for lone parents implied by the budget 
constraint have similar patterns in both countries: there are good financial 
incentives to take a minimum-wage job but poor incentives to increase earnings 
beyond that. Without in-work benefits, there would be a substantial 
unemployment trap for low-income families in the UK, but the situation would 
not be quite as severe without EITC in the US. Subsidies for housing costs and 
childcare costs can substantially reduce the financial reward to work in both 
countries. Although I have not analysed the issue in detail, other studies have 
suggested that an extension of high marginal withdrawal rates may have long-
term implications for workers’ human capital accumulation and earnings growth. 
An extension of this literature to include more explicit comparisons between the 
US and the UK would seem fruitful. 
I have discussed two factors that could limit the comparability of financial 
work incentives between the US and the UK. First, little is known about parents’ 
take-up of in-work and other welfare benefits. Second, although similar in aims, 
there are significant differences in how WFTC and EITC are assessed and paid, 
and these have implications for short-run work incentives and labour market 
dynamics. In particular, it should be expected that an in-work benefit that is paid 
annually will lead to different behavioural responses amongst WFTC and EITC 
recipients from one that is paid fortnightly or monthly. Also, different impacts on 
poverty should be expected over the short run, especially when the value of the 




Timeline of Developments in In-Work Benefits in the US and the UK 
  US UK 
1971    Family income supplement (FIS) 
introduced as a means-tested in-work 
benefit. 
    
1975  Earned income tax credit (EITC) 
introduced with maximum credit of $400. 
 
    
1987  Increase in EITC generosity and credit rate 
to restore the 1975 real value. 
 
    
1988   FIS  replaced by family credit (FC) with 
increased generosity and lower marginal 
withdrawal rates (most instances of MWRs 
> 100% were removed). 
24 hours’ work a week needed to qualify. 
    
1991  Increase in EITC generosity. Separate rate 
for two or more children. Requirement that 
applicants earn more than they receive in 
welfare benefits removed. EITC no longer 
counted in means-tested programmes’ 
income calculations. 
 
    
1992    Qualifying conditions reduced to 16 hours’ 
work a week. 
    
1993  Substantial increase in EITC generosity, 
particularly for families with two or more 
children. EITC for workers without 
children introduced. 
 
    
1995    Extra credit for working more than 30 
hours a week. 
    
1996  PRWORA reformed AFDC/TANF.   
    
1999    Working families’ tax credit replaces FC, 
with increased generosity, longer phase-out 
portion and more generous support for 
childcare. 
    
2000    Increase in generosity. Credit paid through 
wage-packet. 
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TABLE A.2 
US Federal Individual Income Tax Parameters for Families with Children for 2000 
Tax rates   
If annual taxable income is:  Then income tax equals: 
Heads of households   
$0–$35,150  15% of taxable income 
$35,150–$90,800  $5,272.50 + 28% of the amount over $35,150 
$90,800–$147,050  $20,854.50 + 31% of the amount over $90,800 
$147,050–$288,350  $38,292 + 36% of the amount over $147,050 
Over $288,350  $89,160 + 39.6% of the amount over $288,350 
Married couples filing jointly   
$0–$43,850  15% of taxable income 
$43,850–$105,950  $6,577.50 + 28% of the amount over $43,850 
$105,950–$161,450  $23,965.50 + 31% of the amount over $105,950 
$161,450–$288,350  $41,170.50 + 36% of the amount over $161,450 
Over $288,350  $86,854.50 + 39.6% of the amount over $288,350 
Tax allowances   
Head of household  $6,450 
Married couple filing jointly  $7,350 
Deductions  $2,800 per dependant 
Child tax credit  $500 per child 
Social security tax (payroll tax)   
If annual gross income is:  Then social security tax equals: 
$0–$72,600  7.65% of income 
Over $72,600  $5,553.90 + 1.45% of the amount over $72,600 
Notes: Taxable income is income less allowances less deductions. The child tax credit reduces tax liability by 
$500 per child. The overall effect is that a lone parent with two children pays no federal income tax on an 
annual income of up to $18,717. 
Source: Various Internal Revenue Service forms and tables for 2000. 
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TABLE A.3 
UK Income Tax Parameters for Families with Children for 2000 
Tax rates   
If annual taxable income is:  Then income tax equals: 
£0–£1,520  10% of taxable income 
£1,520–£28,400  £152 + 22% of the amount over £1,520 
Over £28,400  £6,065.60 + 40% of the amount over £28,400 
Tax allowance   
Individual £4,385 
Children’s tax credit  £520 per family with children under 16 (from 2001) 
National Insurance contributions   
If weekly income is:  Then weekly contributions are: 
£0–£76 Nothing 
£76–£535  10% of income over £76 
Over £535  £45.90 
Notes: Taxable income is income less the allowance. Married couples file separately. The children’s tax credit 
reduces tax liability by £520 where there are children in the family, but the value is reduced if there is a higher-
rate taxpayer.  
Source: Various Inland Revenue publications. 
 
TABLE A.4 
Detail of Operation of EITC and WFTC 
  Earned income tax credit 
(2000) 
Working families’ tax credit 
(from June 2000) 
Eligibility    
Eligibility  Must have positive earnings in past 
year and annual investment income 
under $2,350. 
Married couples need to file a joint 
tax return; unmarried couples file 
separately. 
Parents need to have a ‘qualifying’ 
child (either theirs or their spouse’s, 
or any other child who was cared for 
all year). ‘Children’ are under 19, or 
under 24 and a student, or 
permanently and totally disabled. 
Where a child potentially qualifies 
two unmarried adults for EITC, only 
the adult with the highest income can 
apply (this includes multiple-tax-unit 
households). 
Must work more than 16 hours a 
week, have dependent children (under 
16 or under 19 and in full-time 
education), have less than £8,000 
capital. Couples need to claim jointly; 
need not be married. 
Extension to those without dependent 
children proposed alongside an 
integrated child credit. 
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  Earned income tax credit 
(2000) 
Working families’ tax credit 
(from June 2000) 
Structure    
Value of basic 
credit 
Credit is annual and is a fraction of 
annual income up to a maximum level 
of $353/$2,353/$3,888 for families 
with 0/1/2+ children.  
Credit is weekly. 
Basic credit of £53.15 plus possible 
30-hour credit of £11.25 plus credits 
for each child at £25.60, or £26.35 for 
16- to 18-year-olds. 
Childcare tax credit is supplementary 
to this. 
     
Tapering  Phase-in threshold applies a 
7.65%/34%/40% credit (for 0/1/2+ 
children) to income until maximum 
credit reached. 
Beyond threshold of $12,690 ($5,770 
for no children), tapered at 
7.65%/15.98%/21.06% (for 0/1/2+ 
children) so that EITC runs out at 
$10,380/$27,413/$31,152. 
Beyond threshold of £91.45, tapered 
at 55%. 
Interaction with other parts of tax and benefit system 
Definition of 
income 
Gross earnings, or ‘modified adjusted 
gross income’ if it is higher and 
claimant is on the taper (‘modified 
adjusted gross income’ is income 
minus standard deductions for tax 
purposes). 
Self-employed: same definition of 
‘income’ as for other tax liabilities. 
Net income (i.e. income after income 
tax and National Insurance). 
Self-employed: same definition of 
‘income’ as for other tax liabilities. 





TANF and food stamps are not 
taxable. 
Child benefit, education maintenance 
allowance, statutory maternity pay, 
maternity allowance, attendance 
allowance, maintenance payments, 
housing benefit and council tax 
benefit awards. 




Federal law prohibits EITC from 
being treated as income for purpose 
of Medicaid, supplemental security 
income, food stamps and low-income 
housing. Since 1991, EITC did not 
count for AFDC assessment; states 
can now count EITC when 
determining TANF awards.  
Awards count as income for housing 
benefit and council tax benefit 
purposes. 
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  Earned income tax credit 
(2000) 
Working families’ tax credit 
(from June 2000) 
Assessment and payment mechanism 
Assessment  Assessed at year-end on past year’s 
income. 
Assessed on average weekly income 
in ‘assessment period’ prior to claim. 
Length of assessment period depends 
on frequency of claimant’s earnings: 
seven weeks for weekly payments, 
eight weeks for fortnightly, 16 weeks 
for four-weekly, four months for 
monthly. Estimated earnings used for 
new workers. 
     
When payable  Annual award is a refund on annual 
tax liability, with any excess paid as a 
lump sum. Families have to file by 15 
April each year. 
Up to $1,418 can be paid in advance 
through the wage-packet for claimants 
who have federal income tax withheld 
from wages. Few elect for this option. 
Weekly award fixed for 26 weeks 
(unless family status changes). 
Paid through wage-packet unless non-
earner in couple elects to receive it or 
unless self-employed. Timing of 
payments aligned with timing of 
wages, so if worker paid monthly in 
arrears, credit will be paid monthly in 
arrears. 
Non-earners paid fortnightly.  
     
To whom paid  Married couples who claim EITC 
have to file a joint tax return. Their 
EITC reduces the joint tax liability. 
They nominate who receives the 
payable part of the credit. 
See ‘Eligibility’ above for other rules 
on who can claim in non-married 
couples. 
Couples decide who receives it. If 
couple cannot agree, then Inland 
Revenue will probably pay to the 
main carer (George et al., 2000). 
Sources: For WFTC — George et al. (2000) and Inland Revenue (2000a and 2000b). For EITC — Internal 
Revenue Service (1999a, 1999b and 2000a) and Committee on Ways and Means (1998).
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